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THE SCOPE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ACTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAND USE REGULATION.
After years of near-disastrous neglect and indifference, local,'
state2
 and federala governmental entities are finally exhibiting con-
cern with environmental preservation. Regulation of private land use
is obviously a necessary adjunct to any effective legislative effort to
preserve the environment. Many state and local governments have
recognized this fact and have enacted regulatory legislation designed
to curtail private landowner activities damaging to the environment.
Typical of these programs are those of California 4 and the town of
1- Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations § 1.22.1, .2, 3.17, .18 (1968).
2
 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 4701-09 (Supp. 1971) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 483:
A (1968) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-46. 1-1 (1969).
8
 42 U.S.C. § 4321 at seq. (1970). See Donovan, The Federal Government and
Environmental Control: Administrative Reform on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 541 (1971); Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better
Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571 (1971).
4 Cal. Gov't Code H 66600 at seq. (West 1966).
66601. Filling of Bay. The Legislature further finds and declares that the
present uncoordinated, haphazard manner in which the San Francisco Bay is
being filled threatens the bay itself and is therefore inimical to the welfare of
both present and future residents of the area surrounding the bay ... and that
further piecemeal filling of the bay may place serious restrictions on navigation
in the bay, may destroy the irreplaceable feeding and breeding grounds of fish
and wildlife in the bay, may adversely affect the quality of bay waters and even
the quality of air in the bay area, and would therefore be harmful to the needs
of the present and future population of the bay region.
66610. Definition; purpose and applicability. For the purposes of this title,
the San Francisco Bay includes the shoals outside the Golden Gate and the water
areas from the south end of the bay to the Golden Gate and to the Sacramento
River line . . . and, specifically, the marshlands (land lying between mean high
tide and five feet above mean sea level) ; tidelands (land lying between mean
high tide and mean low tide) ; and submerged lands (lands lying below mean
low tide), but excluding from the marshlands, tidelands and submerged lands
those lands which are not subject to tidal action... .
66632. Interim provision for permits; "fill" and "materials" defined; per-
mits already issued.
(a) fMny person or governmental agency wishing to place fill in the bay
or to extract submerged materials from the bay shall secure a permit from the
commission. .. .
(b) Whenever a permit is required by a city or county an applicant for a
permit shall file an application with the city council of the city ... or the board
of supervisors of the county. . .
Whenever a permit is not required by a city or county, application for a
permit shall be made directly to the commission.
(c) Upon receipt of the report from the city council or the board of super-
visors ... or upon receipt of an application for a permit made directly to it,
the commission shall hold a public hearing or hearings as to the proposed project
and conduct such further investigation as it deems necessary. . .
(d) The commission shall take action upon the application for the permit,
either denying or granting the permit, within 60 days after it receives the re-
port.... A permit may be granted for a project if the project is either (1) nec-
essary to the health, safety or welfare of the public in the entire bay area, or (2)
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Old Lyme, Connecticut.' In California, the McAteer-Petris Act' cre-
ated the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Developmental Com-
mission (BCDC) to control development around San Francisco Bay.
Recognizing that the ecological balance of the bay was threatened by
the haphazard filling activities of private land developers,' the legisla-
ture empowered the BCDC to issue or deny permits for any proposed
filling projects in the bay. 8 The Old Lyme, Connecticut, regulations
are also aimed at preserving tidal marshlands. In 1968, the Old Lyme
Zoning Commission held hearings to consider amending the existing
zoning ordinance governing marshlands.' Observing that environmental
of such a nature that it will not adversely affect the comprehensive plan being
prepared....
5 Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations §§ 1.22.1, .2, 3.17, .18 (1968).
1.22.1 Tidal Wetlands: Tidal Wetlands are those lands which (1) border on
or lie beneath tidal waters, and (2) are less than 3.5 elevation. .
1.22.2 Tidal Marshlands: Tidal Marshlands are tidal wetlands which are not
beach areas or rocky shore areas, and are switch grass, black grass, saltmeadow
grass, saltmarsh grass, salt grass, and common reed grass.
3.17 Restrictions On The Use of Tidal Wetlands: No construction, recon-
struction or alterations of any building or structure and no filling in, dumping,
discharge of sewerage, or other wastes, piping, excavation, or change of grade is
permitted in any tidal wetlands excepting wooden walkways, warfs [sic] and
duck blinds, public boat landings and ditches opened or kept open by the State
or Town.
Applications for special exceptions from said restrictions may be submitted
to the Zoning Board of Appeals, and the Zoning Board of Appeals is hereby
authorized, after public hearing held upon any such application, to grant a special
permit for any of the following:
(a) the digging or dredging of a channel by a landowner to allow his
boat to be brought from his land to the water, said channel to be only wide
enough and deep enough to accommodate the boat of the applicant;
(b) the placing of a boathouse on pilings—the boathouse to be only
large enough to accommodate the boat of the land owner;
(c) the erection of piers, docks, piles for life lines, rafts, or jetties, and
the filling in with sand and the digging of channels at beaches or rocky shore
areas....
3.18 Restrictions On The Use Of Land Adjoining Tidal Marshlands: No
grading, construction or alteration is permitted within a land buffer zone twenty-
five (25) feet wide adjoining tidal marshlands until there is first submitted to
the Building Inspector a plan of construction, or a plan of grading showing the
details of the proposed construction, excavation, or grading. No permit for such
operations shall be granted unless the plan shall clearly show that the results of
the proposed construction, excavation or grading will not cause any filling in of
the tidal marshlands..
Cal. Gov't Cade §I 66600 of seq. (West 1965).
7 Id.	 66601.
Id. § 66604.
0 "No land in any district which is less than one foot above mean high water shall
be used for construction, nor shall it be filled or paved, nor shall any natural grades be
changed, nor any water course altered or obstructed, except with the approval of the
Zoning Commission, which Commission shall' have found after a public hearing on the
subject, that any proposed operation will not cause any hazard from flooding, will not
adversely affect drainage or ground water level, and will not be detrimental to property
values or the public health, safety, and welfare." Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations
§ 3.16.4 (repealed 1965).
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needs required more definitive measures, the Commission adopted
regulations prohibiting filling, dredging and other similarly harmful
activities. Applications for special exceptions had to be approved by
the town Zoning Board of Appeals."
In two recent cases, Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Developmental Commission, 11 and Bartlett v.
Zoning Commission, 12
 private landowners challenged the constitution-
ality of these regulations on the grounds that they were so restrictive
that they rendered the owners' lands commercially valueless. Such
regulations, the landowners argued, were an unreasonable and arbi-
trary exercise of police power and constituted a taking without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
Despite the factual similarities of the two cases, the courts
reached opposite conclusions. In Candlestick, the appellant, Candle-
stick Properties, Inc., owned a parcel of bayside land which was sub-
merged at high tide. This land had been acquired in 1964 as a place for
the deposit of fill and for ultimate development. Appellant applied to
the BCDC for a permit to fill a portion of this land with fill from con-
struction projects. When the permit was denied, Candlestick Prop-
erties, Inc., filed an action in the San Francisco Superior Court seeking
a review of the Board's decision and a writ of mandate to compel
approval. In the alternative, plaintiff sought damages for the alleged
taking of its property without compensation. The petition for a writ of
mandate was denied and a demurrer to the damage claim was sustained.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held that such land
regulation was properly within the police power of the state." The
court reasoned that the police power is an "indispensable prerogative
of sovereignty" for promotion of the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the public." According to this holding, the only limitation
on the police power is that it not be unreasonably or arbitrarily in-
voked. The court indicated that the necessity and form of police power
regulation are for legislative determination. Therefore, the only ques-
tion for the court to review was whether there was any reasonable basis
of support for the legislation. On examining the legislative determina-
tion according to these standards, the court found that the McAteer-
Petris Act clearly defined the public interest in the environmental
protection of San Francisco Bay.''' It was evident to the court that
haphazard and uncontrolled filling of bay marshlands would upset the
ecological balance of the bay area and would therefore be inimical to
the welfare of present and future bay area residents. Thus the court
10 Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations § 3.17 (1968).
11
 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 CaI. Rptr. 897 (1970).
12 
— Conn. —, 2 E.R.C. 1684 (1971).
18 11 Cal. App. 3d at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
14 Id. at 570, 89 Cal Rptr. at 905.
15 Id. at 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
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found that there was a rational basis for creation of the BCDC with
the power to regulate filling activities. Noting that the restrictions
were not unduly harsh but were in fact necessary for the public
welfare," the court ruled that the zoning regulations were a proper use
of the police power, and that appellant was not entitled to damages."
In Bartlett, the plaintiff, a private landowner, had acquired land
which he desired to fill. When the new zoning ordinances forbid-
ding all filling activities were passed," he filed suit in the Connecticut
Court of Common Pleas for relief from the town Zoning Commission's
amendment of the regulations, claiming that these measures were a
confiscation of his land without just compensation. Both the trial court
and the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the zoning regulations
amounted to a taking of plaintiff's property in violation of his consti-
tutional rights. The higher court acknowledged that preservation of
the environment with its ecological, healthful, aesthetic and economic
benefits was a laudable objective for the ordinances, but noted that the
objective itself was not in issue."
The important question, as the state Supreme Court saw it, was
whether this objective could be accomplished in such a manner. Since
these regulations left the landowner with no reasonable commercial
use for his property, the court concluded that the land was rendered
practically worthless." The court also noted that although the state
legislature had recognized the importance of environmental preserva-
tion, the latter had made no provision for reasonable compensation in
cases where takings were necessary. 21 The court therefore concluded
that the extreme restrictions of the Old Lyme, Connecticut, zoning
regulations were an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of police
power, and thus were confiscatory and unconstitutional."
The common question in these two cases is whether land use
restrictions for the purpose of environmental preservation are a proper
exercise of a government's police power, or whether they constitute a
confiscatory taking of property without just compensation. Although
governmental efforts at maintaining the quality of the environment
will, of necessity, embody significant land use regulation, it is essential
to the success of these efforts that clear constitutional guidelines be
le Id. at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
17 It is worthwhile noting that the McAteer-Petrls Act to save San Francisco Bay
has been hailed as a milestone in environmental legislation. See Note, Saving San Fran-
cisco Bay: A Case Study in Environmental Legislation, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 349, 350 (1970.
Intense public pressure from private citizens and conservation groups resulted in the bill's
enactment, after opposition from lobby groups had stalled it in the initial stages. The
pressure techniques used have been held out as a model for future action by conserva-
tionists. Id. at 365 n.44. A judicial imprimatur on such legislation, as occurred in Candle-
stick, will encourage more public efforts to obtain such measures.
18 Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations 1}{ 1.22.1, .2, 3.17, .18 (1968).
19 — Conn. at —, 2 E.R.C. at 1686.
28 Id.
21 Id.
22 - Conn. at —, 2 E.R.C. at 1687.
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developed and followed by the legislatures and courts. This comment
will examine the broad question of the state's role in environmental
protection. Specifically, it will explore the rationales adopted by the
courts to support their acceptance of the police power as a proper tool
in environmental land use control. These rationales will then be con-
sidered in light of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution. Finally, the respective roles of courts and legislatures will be
analyzed in an attempt to define the scope of government action in
environmental land use control.
I. JUDICIAL RATIONALES FOR UPHOLDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAND
USE REGULATION AS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
The police power is generally defined as the power inherent in the
state to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, safety and
welfare of the public.28 The determination of what is necessary to
promote these goals is a legislative function." The legislatures' con-
cept of the proper scope of this function has been constantly changing
in order to keep pace with the changing values, mores and priorities of
society. While courts have placed certain constitutional limitations on
the police power," the United States Supreme Court has stated that a
precise judicial definition of the outer limits of this power is an impos-
sible task.2°
In the period after the Industrial Revolution, until the 1920's, the
courts were zealous in striking down any state regulation determined to
be violative of individual property rights.27 The courts eventually
22
 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
24 Id.
28
 A state's exclusion of people from state employment solely on the basis of their
membership in an allegedly subversive organization, without regard to knowledge of
organization activities, in order to preserve public security, violated the due process
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91
(1952). A statute calling for sterilization of certain criminals was held to be an invalid
exercise of the police power because it classified crimes arbitrarily, thus violating the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
54142 (1942). Exercise of police power to restrict business activities when no legitimate
public interest demanded it was held a denial of due process. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.
v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935); Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Sig-
gins, 359 Pa. 25, 44-46, 58 A.2d 464, 474-75 (1948).
26 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
27 In this period, the Supreme Court applied the substantive rights interpretation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to economic freedom. In essence,
the Court was upholding the "Iaissez-faire" economic policy of the 19th century and
frowned upon any unnecessary government interference with private enterprise. State
social regulation to enhance the living condition of the community was viewed as un-
necessary intermeddling by the state government. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of
the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 554-56 (1923); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590,
594-95 (1917); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60-63 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578, 588-91 (1897). Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-29 (1963). See
Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 353
(1916).
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abandoned this economic laissez-faire attitude,28 and gradually ex-
panded the police power—with a consequent diminution of concern
for private property. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 29
 the United
States Supreme Court upheld a restrictive zoning ordinance aimed at
fire prevention and the alleviation of overcrowded urban conditions,
even though the regulation decreased the commercial value of appel-
lant's property by seventy-five percent. Originally, zoning ordinances
were thought to be outside the range of police power. Since they were
considered to be based on aesthetic reasons only, it was held that they
could be enforced only through eminent domain." The Court in Euclid,
however, held that the particular zoning regulation in question pro-
moted the health and welfare of the public and was therefore a proper
exercise of police power. The Court stated that the Constitution must
have a certain degree of flexibility in order to meet the changing
demands and priorities of society:
[Millie the meaning of constitutional guaranties never var-
ies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to
meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation"'
Following Euclid, conflicts between the public interest and indi-
vidual property rights resulted in the substantial curtailment of inci-
dents of private property under the exercise of police power. Some
aspects of public welfare promoted by the exercise of police power
were oil conservation," dust and noise abatement," price stability of
agricultural products, 84 flood protection," and open space and water
conservation." With the increasing enactment of environmental legis-
28 The Supreme Court emphasized that social and economic regulations in the public
interest are matters for elected legislators to determine. Courts should not intrude into
this area by substituting the private economic beliefs of judges in overruling legislative
determinations. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S, 502, 537-38
(1934) ; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
20 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
80 See, e.g., Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 36 F.2d 242, 243 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
81 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
82 Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938), The
number of oil wells on appellant's property was limited, thereby depriving him of sub-
stantial income from the wells not allowed to be drilled.
88 Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20
Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). Appellants were prohibited from
conducting rock, sand and gravel operations on their land, thus leaving the land with
no appreciable economic value.
84 Swisher v. Brown, 157 Cob. 378, 402 P.2d 621 (1965). Appellant was required to
destroy a substantial part of his lettuce crop, in which he had invested considerable funds
and labor.
85 Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 111
(1968). Landowners in this case were enjoined from constructing levees on and cutting
channels through flood-susceptible land,
Be Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254
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lation, there has been a definite movement in the courts toward classi-
fying environmental protection as a proper objective for the exercise
of police power." The Candlestick decision is a step forward in the
trend of recent judicial recognition that individual property rights, in-
cluding real property rights, should not be used by courts as an
obstacle to environmental legislation." Advocates of the Candlestick
perspective can point to several rationales which courts have used to
restrict the private use of property.
A. The Balance-of-Interests Test
The laws of nuisance and the recognized public interest in water
and airways provide a sound basis for judicial support of environ-
A.2d 700 (1969). Appellant's property was deprived of all reasonable use because housing
development plans were forbidden in order to preserve watershed and open spaces areas,
and to prevent "urban sprawl."
87
 It has been held a valid exercise of the police power for a state, within its terri-
torial limits, to prohibit the sale of certain products made from endangered species of
animals outside the state, including those from foreign countries. A.E. Nettleton Co. v.
Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 193-94, 264 N.E.2d 118, 123-24, 315 NY S2d 625, 632-33
(1970), appeal dismissed sub nom., Reptile Products Ass'n v. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969, 91
S. Ct. 1201 (1971). The rationale of the court was that the endangered species were
related to the world environment, which in turn affected the welfare of the citizens of
the state. See Adams v. Shannon, 7 Cal. App. 3d 427, 432, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1970) ;
Comment, Constitutional Problems in Environmental Legislation—The Mason Law, 12
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 657 (1971). See generally Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F.
Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 4.40 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971).
88
 Environmental problems and solutions are new to the legislatures and courts. His-
torically, American land policy has not considered environmental needs. As Representative
Paul N. McCloskey has observed, since colonial times the American land and tax system
has encouraged the development of land. McCloskey, Preservation of America's Open
Space: Proposal for a National Land Use Commission, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1167 (1970).
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 commenced the emphasis on development for American
land use policy. For the next 183 years, that frontier expansion program Ieft its mark on
American institutions. Another factor encouraging development was the local property
tax system, the primary source of funds for local governments. This system led to assess-
ment of property on the basis of its "highest and best use," usually industrial and com-
mercial development. Id. at 1170. If such land is owned by farmers or is lying open, the
landowners generally cannot afford the taxes. As a result they sell to individuals who can
afford the taxes, specifically industrial and commercial developers. Modern times have
made increasing demands on local government revenues; hence more and more commercial
development, which results in the present "urban sprawl." Id. Courts have also con-
tributed to this developmental policy by adherence to such principles as that an individual
may use his property as he chooses, so long as this use does not constitute a nuisance to
others. Id. at 1169.
In the 1970's, conservation, rather than development, has become the top priority In
land policy. Id. at 1167. Legislators have begun to recognize this on local, state and fed-
eral levels. See Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations f$ 1.22.1, .2, 3.17, .18 (1968) ; Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. title 12 4701-09 (Supp. 1971) ; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) ; Jack-
son, Foreward: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 Mich. L. Rev.
1073 (1970). But the overall land use and property tax system is not in accord with
public goals. An environmental approach to land use regulation meets stiff resistance be-
cause such an approach is inconsistent with traditional institutions and concepts. Any
effective land use policy would logically have to encompass all land, regardless of owner-
ship, and here the problem of individual property rights arises.
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mental protection." As early as 1915, the Supreme Court upheld a
city ordinance which prohibited appellants from operating a brick-
yard." The decision diminished the value of the land, suitable only for
brickmaking operations, by over ninety percent and in fact put appel-
lants out of business. The Court found that the brickmaking activities
were dangerous to the health of the public because of the fumes and
soot which emanated from the brick ovens. Under these circumstances,
depriving appellants of their property was considered a proper exercise
of the police power, without need for compensation. The Court rea-
soned that to rule otherwise would be to sentence surrounding residents
to permanent misery, without any hope for relief, all in the name of
individual property rights:
It [the police power] may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise,
usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity
for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not
asserted arbitrarily. . . . To so hold would preclude develop-
ment and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There
must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in
the way they must yield to the good of the community."
The Court in effect balanced the interests of the public welfare and
individual property rights; since the public welfare clearly outweighed
the property rights, the latter had to yield.
This balance-of-interests test for land use zoning has also been
applied in the area of flood plain regulation. In Iowa Natural Re-
sources Council v. Van Zee,42 the Iowa Supreme Court stated that if
legislation regulating use of property is to be a lawful exercise of police
power, the public benefit derived from the regulation must outweigh
the restraint on private property." Clearly, in the case of flood plain
zoning, the use of police power is justified because the harm that
results to the public from flooding certainly outweighs the restrictions
on individual property rights."
An interesting slant to the balance-of-interests test was provided
by the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC.45 This action was brought by private conservation organizations
and local municipalities to set aside the Federal Power Commission's
granting of a license to construct a hydroelectric project on the Hudson
River. The court set aside the FPC's action because of the latter's
52 Cf. 6A American Law of Property § 28.23, 28.55, 28.59 (A.J. Casper ed. 1954).
45 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
41 Id. at 410,
42 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 111 (1968).
45 Id. at 1294, 158 N.W.2d at 116.
44 Since 1928, over four billion dollars have been spent on flood control and disaster
relief. This amount does not include billions of dollars in property damage, not to men-
tion the loss of life and injury toll. See Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power,
107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1098, 1100 (1959).
45 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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failure to make a thorough study of alternatives in light of environ-
mental preservation. The court in effect acted as a "watchdog" over
an administrative agency to make sure that the agency balanced com-
peting interests in making its decisions.
Scenic Hudson suggests that environmental cases involving a clash
of public interest and individual property rights are resolvable by the
balance-of-interests procedure. Applying this test to Candlestick, it
appears that the benefit to the public from land fill restrictions in the
San Francisco Bay area far outweighed the harm done to appellant's
individual rights. Conversely, appellant's potential benefit from filling
his land and building on it was miniscule when compared with the
harm that would be caused by the ecological ruination of bay marsh-
lands." If the balance-of-interests test had been used in Bartlett, a
different result would have obtained. The court specifically noted the
great economic, healthful, recreational and aesthetic benefits which
marshland preservation would provide. Yet it based its decision on the
deprivation of individual rights, with no consideration of a balance of
interests.
The balance-of-interests test provides a manageable and familiar
standard against which the courts can judge the propriety of using the
police power as a means of environmental land control. As stated by
the United States Supreme Court:
And where the public interest is involved, preferment of that
interest over the property interest of the individual, to the
extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which
affects property.47
B. The Role-of-Government Approach
One commentator, noting the long history of confusion in the
courts' attempts to distinguish between police power and eminent
domain, suggests that the courts should abandon the quantitative
"diminution of value" theory, which attempts to determine constitu-
tionality by the amount a particular property value is diminished, and
instead adopt a qualitative approach. This approach distinguishes the
government's roles as enterpriser and mediator." In its enterprise
function, government restricts or takes land to enhance its own ma-
terial resource plant—e.g., by building highways to facilitate com-
merce. This type of land control requires compensation because the
harm to an individual's property rights occurs only for the govern-
ment's material benefit. On the other hand, as a mediator, the govern-
ment balances conflicting values of society and comes up with a solu-
tion in the form of legislation. When the government determines that
46 See Cal. Gov't Code I 66601 (West 1965).
47 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928).
48 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 61-62 (1964).
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land use must be restricted to promote one set of societal values over
another, no compensation should be granted.
This qualitative role-of-government analysis, based on govern-
ment function, lends itself to environmental matters. It can be argued
that individual property rights in Candlestick and Bartlett were re-
stricted because the legislature "mediated" the conflicting values of
individual property rights and environmental preservation. In this
mediation, the legislature favored environmental considerations. Thus,
although there may be a decrease in land value, the landowner should
not be compensated because the government does not act to increase
its own material position at the expense of an individual; rather, it acts
to promote what it determines to be the higher goal in a hierarchy of
social values.
The court in Candlestick appears to have used this theory. In its
determination that the necessity for and the form of zoning regulations
were legislative functions, the court stated that even if it determined
that the reasonableness of the legislative decision was debatable, the
court should not interfere." The court, in effect, recognized the media-
tive role of the legislature and demonstrated its hesitancy to interfere in
this area. In Bartlett, on the other hand, the court did not consider the
role-of-government approach. By looking to the amount of value the
property had been diminished, the court appeared to use a quantitative
approach. The role-of-government approach, by avoiding this purely
quantitative diminution test, would have led the Bartlett court to up-
hold the zoning regulations.
C. The Public Trust Doctrine
Another rationale available to the courts to support police power
regulation in environmental matters is the public trust doctrine.'" The
idea of a public right in certain lands, particularly those adjacent to
water, had its origins in western civilization long before the signing
of the Magna Carta.m .Under this theory, government is considered a
trustee in holding public lands. In the United States, this has been true
of tidelands, marshlands and estuarine areas. The Supreme Court has
noted that the states hold those lands "below the high water mark" in
trust for the public." Analogizing to property law concepts, the argu-
49 11 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
50 The idea of a public trust in certain lands has its historical origin in Roman and
English law. A public use was vested in certain areas such as seashores, highways and
running waters; these interests were regarded inalienable by the sovereign. See Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich.
L. Rev. 471, 475-78 (1970).
51. In England, as early as the 14th Century, the Crown could prosecute persons who
interfered with the public rights to flowing waters. Clause 33 of the Magna Carta spe-
cifically mentions public rights on streams throughout England. See Stone, 1 Waters and
Water Rights 181 (R, Clark ed. 1967).
52 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1894); See 3 American Law of Property
12.32 (kJ. Cosner ed. 1952).
791
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ment in favor of regulation by police power would contend that since
this land is trust property, it should be held available for the uses for
which the trust was established—the service of the people.' The
public interest cannot be alienated in fee to private individuals; the
public trust remains impressed on the land, and any conveyance by the
state is subject to the right of the public since a grantor cannot convey
a greater interest to the grantee than the grantor himself holds." Such
grants are therefore always encumbered by the public trust." While
grants of public trust lands are permitted subject to the public encum-
brance, the state cannot relinquish its governing authority in such con-
veyances."
Since it holds tidelands and marshlands in public trust, the state
has certain implied powers as trustee. These powers include everything
necessary to the carrying out of the trustee function." Although the
purpose of holding wetlands in public trust has traditionally been
delineated in terms of navigation, commerce, and fisheries, 58 one writer
has suggested extending the public trust doctrine into environmental
affairs." At the very least, the state could justify regulation of tide-
lands to preserve environmental quality in terms of its effect on the
fishing industry." Neither Candlestick nor Bartlett alluded to the
58 Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957).
U Stone, 1 Waters and Water Rights 196-97 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
55 See, e.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 82 (1913).
56
 In 1869, the Illinois legislature had granted to the Illinois Railroad more than a
thousand acres of submerged lakefront land along the business district of Chicago. The
legislature repealed this grant in 1873 in order to facilitate harbor control. The Supreme
Court upheld the repeal of this grant since such a conveyance of public trust lands was
beyond the power of the legislature in the first place. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892).
Another case in this area concerned a situation where the Massachusetts legislature
created the Greylock Reservation Commission to preserve Mount Greylock as a natural
woodland area. In 1953, the legislature created an administrative authority to construct
a tramway and ski facilities on Mount Greylock, and directed the Greylock Commission
to lease a portion of the woodlands to the authority. The administrative authority lacked
funds and Invited a private corporation to underwrite the project. Private citizens brought
suit as representatives of the public trust to invalidate the whole transaction involving
the two administrative bodies and the private corporation. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that both administrative agencies had overstepped their express au-
thority in managing public trust !ands by permitting their use for a private commercial
venture. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 426-27, 215 N.E.2d 114,
126 (1966).
67 See, e.g., Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 37 (1970).
58 Id.
59 The public trust doctrine has traditionally been applied with narrow scope. It
has included only areas such as seashores, streams and parklands. However, public trust
problems arise whenever environmental public interests need protection against individ-
uals and groups. Therefore, judicial application of the doctrine would seen to be appro-
priate in most environmental situations. Sax, supra note 50, at 556-57.
60 It is estimated that two-thirds of all coastal sport fish are estuary-dependent dur-
ing part of their lives. Hearings on Estuarine Areas Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 90th
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public trust doctrine, even though it is an applicable ground for deci-
sion in cases involving marshland areas. It is submitted that this
doctrine would have provided a firmer legal foundation for the Candle-
stick decision, and would likely have produced a different result in
Bartlett.
II. THE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION IN LAND USE REGULATION
A. Constitutional Considerations
In this conflict between the ecological and the Constitu-
tional, it is plain that neither is to be consumed by the other.'
The impassioned pleas of environmentalists concerning the pre-
carious environmental situation cannot be allowed to obscure the Sixth
Amendment's command that the Constitution is the supreme law of
the land ea The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ordinarily preclude
the states from taking private property for public use without just
compensation." Although all property held by private individuals is
subject to the police power of the state, the state's power to regulate
is not unlimited. The regulation must bear a rational relation to sub-
jects which fall within the police power." In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon," Mr. Justice Holmes stated that while property use may be
limited to an extent, if this regulation goes so far as practically to
extinguish all property rights, the regulation is no longer rationally
related to the subject of the police power. At this point, regulation may
be exercised only through eminent domain. A laudable public purpose
cannot cure unconstitutionality:
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achiev-
ing the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change."
Just where the line between regulation of property through the
police power, on the one hand, and eminent domain, on the other, must
be drawn is a question not easily answered. Each case must be con-
sidered on its own particular facts. One case has held that a seventy
percent decrease in property value was excessive and unreasonable."
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-3 at 29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearingsl. See generally, I
U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Panel Reports ch. I at 28 (1969).
01 Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 111, 206
N.E.2d 666, 671 (1965).
82 U.S. Const. art. VI,
'38 See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 618
(1935).
64 See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 308, 197 A.2d
770, 772 (1964).
65 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
66 Id. at 416.
67 Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 310-12, 197 A.2d 770,
773-74 (1964).
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Certainly, most courts agree that where the total value of the property
is destroyed, the owner must be compensated." This view has been
extended specifically to marshland zoning regulations similar to those
in Candlestick and Bartlett." Thus, whenever the courts have deter-
mined that the legislature has taken too much in its exercise of police
power, the restrictions have been struck clown as excessive and un-
reasonable.
Candlestick appears to be an anomaly in this area, but on close
analysis, the decision is not irreconcilable with the Bartlett viewpoint.
The appellant in Candlestick introduced no evidence to show that his
land had no reasonable alternative commercial uses. The exact extent
of the deprivation of land value was not determined. The Old Lyme,
Connecticut, zoning regulations specifically enumerated the uses to
which marshland areas could be put—e.g., duck blinds, boat landings
and boat houses." It was clear from these limitations that no reason-
able commercial profit could be realized from the uses. The McAteer-
Petris Act was not so specific as to how the land could be used. It
simply forbade filling. In Candlestick, the court noted that the zoning
regulations of the McAteer-Petris Act "are designed to preserve the
existing character of the bay while it is determined how the bay should
be developed in the future."' The court determined that the regula-
tions left room for alternative commercial development which would
not harm the environment.
The court in Candlestick has been criticized for evading a con-
stitutional discussion of the police power. 72 This criticism is overly
harsh. The court simply had no necessity to make such a constitutional
determination. Without clear evidence as to the diminution of the
value of plaintiff's property, the court had no reason to overrule the
es See, e.g., East Coast Lumber Terminal, Inc. v. Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 110 (2d
Cir. 1949); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J.
539, 557, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963) ; Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y.
222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938) ; Phoenix v. Burke, 9 Ariz. App. 395, 452 P.2d 722,
723 (1969). See Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning, Pt. I: A Method
of Analysis, 1969 Wash. U.L.Q. 263, 272-77.
69 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated that there is definitely a
public purpose behind environmental zoning regulations limiting filling activities in marsh-
lands. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 111, 206
N.E2d 666, 671 (1965). The court noted, however, that conservation is not a blank
check to taking: "An unrecognized taking in the guise of regulation is worse than con-
fiscation." Id. at 110-11, N.E.2d at 671. Thus when such regulations go too far in re-
stricting property value, eminent domain is called for. A Maine case also involved a
question of the constitutionality of marshland zoning regulations for conservation pur-
poses. The court decided that conditions so burdensome may be put on the use of the
land by zoning regulation that there is the equivalent of an outright taking although title
to the property and some vestiges of ownership remain. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711,
715 (Me. 1970).
70 Old Lyme, Conn., Zoning Regulations 1 3.17 (1968).
71 11 Cal. App. 3d at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
72 Note, Coastal Zone Management—The Tidelands: Legislative Apathy vs. Judicial
Concern, 8 San Diego L. Rev. 695, 710 (1971).
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legislation. If the Candlestick decision is limited to its facts, it is not
irreconcilable with traditional constitutional considerations in the de-
termination of whether a certain land use regulation goes too far. As
Mr. Justice Brandeis once noted, where the constitutional question
need not be determined, the legislation will not be overturned on con-
stitutional grounds."
Another constitutional aspect that must be considered is that an
individual should not be required to pay more than his fair share of
governmental burdens. If something more or different is required of
him than of the rest of the members of society, he should be accorded
fair compensation." One of the historical reasons for holding land use
regulation unconstitutional has been that such regulation operates
unfairly upon one person:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."
Of course, the landowner, as well as other members of the public,
benefits from the zoning restriction. But the benefit-sharing would be
so disproportionate to the burden the landowner bears as to require a
conclusion that such an exercise of police power is unreasonable and
violative of due process."
To so burden certain individual landowners beyond their fair
share also raises a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection problem.
The state is charging one class of society—certain landowners—for
a benefit which is to be shared by all of society. Such a classification is
related to the legislative purpose of the zoning, and fair compensation
through eminent domain would satisfy the equal protection clause.
But the exercise of police power works such an unfair distribution of
the cost that the classification becomes arbitrary and unreasonable."
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion). There is not
a complete dichotomy of views between the courts and legislatures as to the scope of
police power regulation. A number of state legislatures have recognized constitutional
limitations and have authorized eminent domain proceedings for environmental land use
zoning. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. f 26-17a (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Conserv. Law § 423
(McKinney 1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. 113-226(a) (1965). See also Heath, Estuarine Con-
servation Legislation in the States, 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 351 (1970). Representative
Paul N. McCloskey of California, an outspoken advocate of environmental protection
through land use regulation, has suggested that the entire American system of land use
should be overhauled. He would hold sacred no present law, except the Fifth Amendment
requirement of just compensation for takings. McCloskey, supra note 38, at 1167.
14 See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
75 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
70 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
77 Cf. Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 52 Hawaii 327, 475 P.2d 679 (1970). The
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a statute which required private employers to reim-
burse employees for wages lost as a result of jury duty, service on public commissions
and the like was a violation of equal protection. The statute worked an invidious class
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The mere accident of land ownership in an environmentally vital area
should not determine the question of who bears the cost of environ-
mental protection. Eminent domain proceedings assure an equitable
distribution of this cost. The landowner's share is the difference be-
tween the eminent domain compensation and the profit he might have
made through his own ingenuity and sound commercial practice; the
public's share is the tax revenue which is used to pay the eminent
domain compensation.
B. Judicial Attempts at Certainty—Legislative Initiative Is Needed
Courts have labored at distinguishing compensable from non-
compensable taking, but they have been able to establish no general
theory." There have been many suggested theories," but none has
been consistently adhered to. The various court rationales have been
described as a "crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine""
recognizing no set rules. Furthermore, it has been said that "ambiguity
seems to be the rule rather than the exception in these cases." 81 This
confusion is traceable to Justice Holmes' pronouncement in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon that any such distinction is a question of
degree." But even Justice Holmes was inconsistent in adhering to this
view in other cases. In Pennsylvania Coal, he noted that a strong
public desire does not justify shortcuts around the Constitution." Yet
in Noble State Bank v. Haskell," he stated:
[P]olice power extends to all the great public needs. . . . It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or
held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
discrimination against employers by requiring them to bear the cost of a public benefit.
Id. at —, 475 P.2d at 683.
78 See Comment, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for Its Protection and
Development, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 728, 735 (1967); Netherton, Implementation of Land Use
Policy: Police Power v. Eminent Domain, 3 Land & Water L. Rev. 33, 41 (1968).
72 See Sax, supra note 48, at 46-61. These theories include the "invasion theory,"
whereby government lowers property value by regulation and then appropriates the
property at much less than its original value—in effect taking the land without com-
pensation. Courts have generally rejected this guise of taking. But see United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), which held that the War Production
Board was permitted to close privately owned mines to supply labor for defense work.
Compensation was denied since the government never took possession of the mines, even
if the effect of the regulation was to put the mines out of business. The "noxious use
theory" holds that certain harmful uses of property can be destroyed without compensa-
tion. This theory works in simple nuisance situations, but is insufficient for the multitude
of cases involving no clear noxious use. The "diminution of value theory" determines
where eminent domain should be used by the value that the property has been decreased.
This theory has its origin in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See
discussion at p. 793, supra.
80 Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Supreme Court Review 63.
81 Sax, supra note 48, at 46.
82 260 US. at 413-16.
so Id. at 416.
84 219 U.S. 104 (1911)
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opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare."
The Supreme Court, in Goldblatt v. Hempstead," had an oppor-
tunity to resolve the ambiguity. Appellants' sand and gravel operation
was prohibited by a town zoning ordinance. The reason for the restric-
tion was that the mining activities below the water table created a
twenty-acre lake within a mile of the town's residential area. The lake
was considered a hazard to public safety. The Court alluded to the
problem of deciding how far a regulation might go before it becomes
a taking, but held that there was no need to decide the question in the
absence of evidence showing how far appellants' property value was
reduced."
The inability of courts to formulate a rule as to exactly when a
restrictive zoning regulation becomes a taking leaves legislatures with
two alternatives. The first is to use the police power to the brink of its
constitutional limits. The problem here is that when these limits are
overstepped and inverse condemnation proceedings are instigated,
courts must make determinations which are more appropriately in the
legislative sphere. Complex environmental policies are beyond the
technological sophistication of courts and it is desirable that they not
question legislative determinations in this area." Thus, when a legisla-
ture ascertains that environmental protection demands certain restric-
tions on the use of real property, and that these restrictions should be
enforced under the police power, courts should not interfere unless
there is no rational relation between the remedy and the purpose of the
statute. Leaving the judicial branch solely with the responsibility for
determining who is to bear the burden of environmental action is likely
to overburden the courts. With a lack of overall policy guidelines from
the legislature, judicial policy would have to evolve on a case-by-case
analysis.
The second alternative is for legislatures to anticipate the prob-
lems and hardships involved and to incorporate fair and equitable
solutions into environmental zoning laws. This is the preferable al-
ternative because legislatures are better equipped to weigh priorities
and to make the complex technological determinations necessary in
environmental protection. Also, this latter alternative avoids burden-
some and expensive litigation by anticipating disputes, providing equi-
table solutions and avoiding the necessity for relying on the courts for
answers. The Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 89 is an
example of how legislative foresight can eliminate constitutional prob-
88 Id. at 111.
88 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
87 Id. at 594.
88 See 3 Land & Water L. Rev., supra note 78, at 56-57; see also Note, The Role of
the Court in Protecting the Environment—A Jurisprudential Analysis, 23 S.C. L. Rev.
93 (1971).
89 23 U.S.C. g 131 (1970).
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lens. The Act called for state action in removing billboards, junk-
yards, and other roadside eyesores. The law anticipated financial
hardships and inequities and provided for compensation to individuals
whose property was taken.
C. Financial Considerations
If environmental land use objectives cannot constitutionally be
achieved through exercise of the police power, the only means of
attaining them would be to pay for them out of the public treasury.
Substantial doubt exists as to the availability of funds for such under-
takings." Potential liability of the states through inverse condemna-
tion proceedings would discourage lawmakers from stiff legislative
measures, thus resulting in constitutionally safe but ineffective zoning
laws 91
 Representative McCloskey of California, in a discussion con-
cerning the importance of preserving open-space land, accurately
stated the problem:
It can properly be said that local governments have the
problems while the federal government has the money to
solve them. Since the passage of the sixteenth amendment in
1913, the graduated income tax has radically changed the
concept of federalism. In order to meet the financial burdens
of four major wars, federal income taxes have been progres-
sively increased. Once these taxes have been accepted for war
purposes, they have generally been retained even after the
return of peace. . . . As a result, the decade of the 1970's
began with local governments facing the problems of environ-
mental hazards, but with the federal government having
almost a monopoly on the major source of revenue with
which to attack these problems—the income derived from a
growing gross national product."
To solve this difficulty, Representative McCloskey proposes a
National Land Use Commission, consisting of a chairman and four
members, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate."
This commission would have power to designate the uses to which par-
ticular areas might be put— i.e., development, agriculture or conserva-
90 See Comment, supra note 78, at 735.
91 One commentator has noted this effect in zoning relating to highway takings In
highway building programs, legislatures usually establish "set back" areas along the high-
way where land is regulated to a certain depth. Legislatures will restrict this land use to
a much lesser extent if faced with inverse condemnation liability to landowners along the
entire length of the highway. Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of
Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Con-
demnation, 1968 Urban L. Annual 1, 2,
92 McCloskey, Preservation of America's Open Space: Proposal for a National Land
Use Commission, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1167, 1171 (1970).
93
 Id. at 1172-74.
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tion of open spaces. It would monitor all open space land, and no
unauthorized use of the land would be permitted without the commis-
sion's approval.
This proposal would involve an enormous data-gathering and
indexing problem, and would not be feasible without a large degree of
participation and cooperation from state and local governments. If the
commission designated a particular use for which an area might be
put, and the state or local government were without sufficient funds
to facilitate the commission's determination through eminent domain
proceedings, the state or local government could obtain these funds
from the commission. To finance this program, Representative
McCloskey proposes an Urban Development and Conservation Fund
from the federal treasury, with an initial outlay of one billion dollars.
While Representative McCloskey's proposal is addressed to con-
servation of open-space lands, it is readily adaptable to use in the
preservation of marshlands and other environmentally threatened
areas. In light of federal recognition of the importance of environ-
mental protection, including marshlands and estuarine areas," the
time is ripe for a national environmental land use commission similar
to but broader in scope than that proposed by Representative
McCloskey. The commission would monitor all environmental land use
—open-space, marshland, and others. It would subsidize state and
local governments with the necessary funds. Such an undertaking
would necessitate a larger administrative organization than Repre-
sentative McCloskey's five-man commission, but in essence would
serve the same function.
The original fund outlay for such a commission would also have
to be considerably larger than one billion dollars. These funds would
have to come from income taxes, either by increasing them or, prefer-
ably, by diverting funds from other priorities. In addition to direct
expenditures from tax revenues, other fund raising methods could be
utilized. One such source is assessment liens when commission action
results in an increase of land value." These liens would equal seventy-
five percent of the increase in value payable upon sale or development
of the property.
Another method of raising revenue might be through the issuance
of environmental bonds by state or local governments. Investment
could be encouraged by tax-exempt interest payments. Or, in the
interest of tax equity and efficiency, the federal government could tax
the interest on the bonds and subsidize the state and local governments
directly with this added revenue. A further possibility would be a
federal financing authority for environmental land regulation which
would purchase environmental land regulation bonds of state and local
" See Hearings, supra note 60, at 29. U.S. Commission on Marine Science, supra
note 60, ch. I, at 28.
95 McCloskey, supra note 92, at 1174.
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governments, and finance these purchases by issuing its own taxable
obligations."
Implementation of the proposal for a national commission, includ-
ing problems of organization, cooperation with state and local govern-
ments and choice of financing methods, would be primarily a task for
Congress. Congress has the responsibility to act as soon as possible to
protect the environment, and to seek constitutional means to accom-
plish this task. Legislative procrastination allows environmental condi-
tions to deteriorate to a point where emergency action is called for,° 7
and much more costly and restrictive measures must be employed B8
CONCLUSION
It is generally recognized that a comprehensive program of land
use regulation is prerequisite to an effective environmental protection
program. In numerous cases the courts have recognized environmental
protection as a justification for the exercise of a state's police power.
Such rationales as the balance-of-interests test, the role-of-government
approach, and the public trust doctrine have provided familiar theo-
retical underpinnings for the application of this power. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, however, place certain
limits on the use of the police power. The exact point at which the
Constitution forbids takings without compensation and instead re-
quires eminent domain proceedings is difficult to pinpoint. It would
seem, however, that total deprivation of commercial land use, as in
both Candlestick and Bartlett, would require compensation. In this
regard, the various state legislatures should anticipate the question of
police power versus eminent domain to ensure that their respective
regulations are constitutional.
The alternative—i.e., waiting for inverse condemnation proceed-
ings to settle the questions on a cumbersome case-by-case basis—not
only puts an enormous litigative burden on the courts, but requires
them to become involved in technological environmental determina-
tions and to weigh the competing social priorities behind such deci-
96 See Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to
Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 352,
376-79 (1970).
OT An excellent example is the famous Santa Barbara oil spill. After this disaster,
definitive federal regulations were finally passed on the environmental responsibilities of
government lessees in oil, gas, and sulphur operations on the outer continental shelf. 30
C.F.R. § 250 at seq. (1971). See also Sax, supra note 50, at 474.
98 When an emergency situation exists, constitutional requirements of due process
are not strictly observed. See, e.g., North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908). In this case, the Supreme Court held that city health inspectors were permitted
summarily to destroy contaminated meat without giving the owners notice or opportunity
for a judicial determination. The owners of such meat could not complain of a violation
of due process because of the imminent danger that putrified meat presents to the public
safety. See also United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) and
Caldwell, The Ecosystem As a Criterion For Public Land Policy, 10 Natural Resources
3. 203, 214-15 (1970).
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sions. Such determinations are certainly more appropriately the re-
sponsibility of the legislatures. Use of eminent domain proceedings of
course will involve considerable sums of money. It is generally con-
ceded that the states do not have sufficient funds for such programs.
Inevitably, then, federal subsidization, either from increased taxation,
a rearrangement of spending priorities, or from other revenue raising
methods, is essential.
While many questions concerning environmental programs remain
unanswered, it appears certain that inaction will lead to worsening
environmental conditions, necessitating more drastic and even more
expensive remedies. Thus every effort must be made to move quickly,
albeit constitutionally, to meet head on the growing threat to our
environment.
FRANK J. TEAGUE
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